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Abstract
CoVaR is a measure for systemic risk of the networked financial system con-
ditional on institutions being under distress. The analysis of systemic risk is the
focus of recent econometric analyzes and uses tail event and network based tech-
niques. Here, in this paper we bring tail event and network dynamics together into
one context. In order to pursue such joint efforts, we propose a semiparametric
measure to estimate systemic interconnectedness across financial institutions based
on tail-driven spillover effects in a high dimensional framework. The systemically
important institutions are identified conditional to their interconnectedness struc-
ture. Methodologically, a variable selection technique in a time series setting is
applied in the context of a single-index model for a generalized quantile regression
framework. We could thus include more financial institutions into the analysis to
measure their tail event interdependencies and, at the same time, be sensitive to
non-linear relationships between them. Network analysis, its behaviour and dy-
namics, allows us to characterize the role of each financial industry group in 2007
- 2012: the depositories received and transmitted more risk among other groups,
the insurers were less affected by the financial crisis. The proposed TENET - Tail
Event driven NETwork technique allows us to rank the Systemic Risk Receivers
and Systemic Risk Emitters in the U.S. financial market.
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1. Introduction
Systemic risk endangers the stability of the financial market, the failure of one institution
may harm the whole financial system. The sources of risk are complex, as both exogenous
and endogenous factors are involved. This calls for a study on a financial network which
accounts for interaction between the agents in the financial market. Although the notion
systemic risk is not novel in academic literature (see, e.g, Minsky (1977)), it had been
neglected both in academia and in the financial risk industry until the outbreak of the
financial crisis in 2008. Some financial institutions collapsed, even some major ones like
Lehman Brothers, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). The magnitude of repercussions caused by
this financial crisis and its complexity revealed a significant flaw in financial regulations.
As in the past, regulations had been focused primarily on stability of a single financial
institution. The detailed actions involved the establishment of Financial Stability Board
(FSB) after G-20 London summit in 2009, integration of systemic risk agenda into Basel
III in 2010 prior to the G-20 meeting in Seoul, and enacting the Dodd Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd Frank Act’) in the U.S. in 2010, which is
said to have bought the most radical changes into the U.S. financial system since the
Great Depression.
In this context, the focus is on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) whose
failure may not only impair the functioning of the financial system but also have adverse
effects on the real sectors of the economy. Therefore, we face several challenges such
as identifying SIFIs, studying the propagation mechanism of a shock in a system, or in
a network formed by financial institutions, investigating the response of a system to a
shock as a whole network and establishing a theoretical framework for systemic risk.
Although systemic risk is a relatively straightforward concept aimed at measuring risk
stemming from interaction between the agents, the variety of systemic risk measures and
diversity of methods to model interaction effects lead to the fact that the literature on
this topic is highly heterogenous. The relevant literature in this field can be broadly di-
vided into two groups: economic modelling of systemic risk and financial intermediation
including microeconomic (e.g. Beale et al. (2011), Eisenberg and Noe (2001)) and macroe-
conomic approaches (e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)) with the emphasis on theoretical,
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structural frameworks, and quantitative modelling with the emphasis on empirical anal-
ysis. The quantitative literature can be further classified by statistical methodology into
quantile regression based modelling such as linear bivariate model by Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2011), Acharya et al. (2012), Brownlees and Engle (2015), high-dimensional
linear model by Hautsch et al. (2015), partial quantile regression by Giglio et al. (2012)
and by Chao et al. (2015). Further approaches include principal-component-based analy-
sis, e.g. by Bisias et al. (2012), Rodriguez-Moreno and Pen˜a (2013) and others; statistical
modelling based on default probabilities by Lehar (2005), Huang et al. (2009), and others;
graph theory and network topology, e.g. Boss et al. (2006), Chan-Lau et al. (2009), and
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014).
Our paper belongs to the quantitative group of the aforementioned literature, namely,
modelling the tail event driven network risk based on quantile regressions augmented
with non-linearity and variable selection in a high dimensional time series setting. Our
method is in nature different from Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2015)’s
method. Acharya et al. (2012) has measured the systemic risk relevance without captur-
ing the network effects of liquidity exposure, and Brownlees and Engle (2015) analyze
the risk of a specific asset given the distress of the whole system, which is a reverse of our
system at institutional analysis, and their method would capture little spillover effects.
Therefore, we believe, that our method is a good addition to the literature of systemic
risk measures. Also compared to Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), we focus more on the tail
event driven interconnectedness, which cannot be captured by conditional correlation.
As a starting point of our research we take co-Value-at-Risk, or CoVaR, model by Adri-
an and Brunnermeier (2011) (from here on abbreviation as AB), where ‘co-’ stands for
‘conditional’, ‘contagion’, ‘comovement’. To capture the tail interconnectedness between
the financial institutions in the system AB evaluate bivariate linear quantile regressions
for publicly traded financial companies in the U.S..
Whereas AB focus on bivariate measurement of tail risk, we aim at assessing the systemic
risk contribution of each institution conditional on its tail interconnectedness with the
relevant institutions. Thus, the primary challenge is selecting the set of relevant risk
drivers for each financial institution. Statistically we address this issue by employing
a variable selection method in the context of single-index model (SIM) for generalized
quantile regressions, i.e. for quantiles and expectiles. We further extend it to a time
series variable selection context in high dimensions. The semi-parametric framework due
to the SIM allows us to investigate possible non-linearities in tail interconnectedness.
Based on identified relevant risk drivers we construct a financial network consisting of
spillover effects across financial institutions. Further we define two indices: Systemic
Risk Receiver and Systemic Risk Emitter, which combine network structure and market
capitalization to identify the systemically important financial institutions.
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The assumption of non-linear relationship between returns of financial companies is moti-
vated by previous work by Chao et al. (2015), who find that the dependency between any
pair of financial assets is often non-linear, especially in periods of economic downturn.
Moreover, non-linearity assumption is more flexible especially in a high dimensional set-
ting where the system becomes too complex to support the belief of linear relationships.
From the 2012 U.S. financial company list from NASDAQ, we select 100 financial institu-
tions consisting of the top 25 financial institutions from each industry group: Depositories,
Insurance companies, Broker-Dealers and Others. These four groups are divided by S-
tandard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Our model is evaluated, based on weekly
log returns of these 100 publicly traded U.S. financial institutions. Firm specific charac-
teristics from balance sheet information such as leverage, maturity mismatch, market to
book and size are added into the model as well. Furthermore, the macro state variables
are also involved. The time period from 5 January, 2007 to 4 January, 2013 covers one
recession (from December 2007 to June 2009) and several documented financial crises
(2008 and 2011). Dividing companies by industry groups and including several market
perturbations allows not only to select the key players for each time period, but also
additionally to highlight the connections between financial industries, which can in turn
provide additional information on the nature of market dislocations. In application we
find out that there are more interconnectedness between 2008 and 2010. While the bank
sector plays a major role in the financial crisis, the insurance companies, however, play
more passive roles in term of risk transmission and risk reception. The most connected
financial institutions with respect to incoming and outgoing links are ranked based on
our network analysis. The new insight of our finding is that the non-linear relationships
between financial firms are stronger during the financial crisis than the stable periods.
In addition, to identify the systemically important firm, we weight the connections by
firms’s market capitalization. The empirical findings suggest that our method can effec-
tively identify the systemic risk relevant firms similar to the literature. Moreover, we can
discover the asymmetry and non linearity of the firms’ dependency structure, which leads
to more accurate measures in terms of backtesting performance. All the R programs for
this paper can be found on www.quantlet.de or www.quantlet.de/d3/ia/.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 our approach of systemic risk
modelling is outlined. Section 3 illustrates the empirical application. Section 4 concludes.
Appendix A presents the statistical methodology and the related theorems. Appendix B
contains proofs and Appendix C contains tables and graphs of our estimation results.
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2. Systemic Risk Modelling
In this section, we lay down the background and the basic setup of our systemic risk
analysis, which can be divided into three steps.
2.1. Basic concepts
Traditional measures assessing riskiness of a financial institution such as Value at Risk
(VaR), or expected shortfall (ES) are based either on company characteristics or inte-
grated macro state variables which account for the general state of the economy. Thus,
for example, the VaR of a financial institution i at τ ∈ (0, 1) is defined as:
P(Xi,t ≤ V aRi,t,τ ) def= τ, (1)
where τ is the quantile level, Xi,t represents the log return of financial institution i at
time t. AB propose, the risk measure CoVaR (Conditional Value at Risk) which takes
spillover effects and the macro state of the economy into account. The CoVaR of a
financial institution j given Xi at level τ ∈ (0, 1) at time t is defined as:
P
{
Xj,t ≤ CoV aRj|i,t,τ |Ri,t
} def
= τ, (2)
where Ri,t denotes the information set which includes the event of Xi,t = V aRi,t,τ and
Mt−1. Note that Mt−1 is a vector of macro state variables reflecting the general state of
the economy (see Section 4 for details of macro state variables).
We start with the concept of CoVaR, which is estimated in two steps of linear quantile
regression:
Xi,t = αi + γiMt−1 + εi,t, (3)
Xj,t = αj|i + γj|iMt−1 + βj|iXi,t + εj|i,t, (4)
F−1εi,t(τ |Mt−1) = 0 and F−1εj|i,t(τ |Mt−1, Xi,t) = 0 are assumed. AB propose, in the first
step, to determine VaR of an institution i by applying quantile (tail event) regression
of log return of company i on macro state variables. The βj|i in (4) has standard linear
regression interpretation, i.e. it determines the sensitivity of log return of an institution
j to changes in tail event log return of an institution i. In the second step the CoVaR is
calculated by plugging in VaR of company i at level τ estimated in (5) into the equation
(6):
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V̂aRi,t,τ = αˆi + γˆiMt−1, (5)
ĈoVaR
AB
j|i,t,τ = αˆj|i + γˆj|iMt−1 + βˆj|iV̂aRi,t,τ , (6)
Thus, the risk of a financial institution j is calculated via a macro state and a VaR of an
institution i. Here the coefficient β̂j|i of (6) reflects the degree of interconnectedness. By
setting j to be the return of a system, e.g. value-weighted average return on a financial
index, and i to be the return of a financial company i, we obtain the contribution CoVaR
which characterizes how a company i influences the rest of the financial system. By doing
the reverse, i.e. by setting j equal to a financial institution and i to a financial system,
one obtains exposure CoVaR, i.e. the extent to which a single institution is exposed to
the overall risk of a system.
This approach allows us to identify the key elements of systemic risk, namely, network ef-
fects, a single institution’s contribution to systemic risk and a single institution’s exposure
to systemic risk. In our models, we expand AB’s method in three aspects. First of all,
AB perform pairwise quantile regression, since two companies are not interacting in an
isolated environment, all other interaction effects need to be considered. This motivates
us to extend this bivariate model to a (ultra)high dimensional setting by including more
variables into the analysis, hence a variable selection should be carried out. Secondly,
a linear relationship between system return and a single institution’s return is assumed
by AB. Hautsch et al. (2015) apply a linear LASSO based variable selection to select
variables to estimate the VaR of the system. We enhance their methodologies by employ-
ing the nonlinear models because of the complexity of the financial system. The flexible
SIM will be implemented to allow the nonlinear relationship in this case. Thirdly, AB
use average market valued asset returns weighted by lagged market valued total assets
to calculate the system return, as they point out it may create mechanical correlation
between a single financial institution and the value-weighted financial index. Instead of
the regression on system return, we proposed two market capitalization weighted indices
which combine the connectedness structure of the companies: the index of Systemic Risk
Receiver and the index of Systemic Risk Emitter, to measure the systemic risk contribu-
tions, and further to identify the systemically important financial institutions.
2.2. Step 1 V aR Estimation
TENET can be illustrated by three steps. In the first step we estimate VaR for each
financial institution by using linear quantile regression as in AB:
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Xi,t = αi + γiMt−1 + εi,t, (7)
V̂aRi,t,τ = αˆi + γˆiMt−1, (8)
Xi,t and Mt−1 are defined as in section 2.1. Note that the VaR is estimated by the linear
quantile regression (7) of log returns of an institution i on macro state variables. This
is justified by the analysis of Chao et al. (2015), who found evidence of linear effects in
regressing Xi,t on Mt−1.
2.3. Step 2 Network Analysis
2.3.1. Connectedness Analysis
In this step, TENET builds up a risk interdependence network based on SIM for quantile
regression with variable selection. Note that our model can be easily extended to the
case of expectiles, which provide coherent risk measures. First the basic element of the
network: CoVaR calculation has to be determined. As in equation (2), Xj represents
a single institution, and the CoVaR of institution j is estimated by conditioning on its
information set. This information set will not only include the asset returns of other
firms estimated and the macro variables used in the previous step, but also uses control
variables on internal factors of institution j, i.e. the company specific characteristics such
as leverage, maturity mismatch, market-to-book and size. This setting will allow us to
model the risk spillover channels among institutions mostly caused by liquidity or risk
exposure. Our choice of information set is more comprehensive than AB, and a similar
motivation can be found in Hautsch et al. (2015). Further, a systemic risk network is
built motivated by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014). TENET captures nonlinear dependency
as it is based on a SIM quantile variable selection technique. See Appendix for more
details of the statistical methodology. More precisely:
Xj,t = g(β
>
j|RjRj,t) + εj,t, (9)
ĈoVaR
TENET
j|R˜j ,t,τ
def
= ĝ(β̂>
j|R˜j R˜j,t), (10)
D̂j|R˜j
def
=
∂ĝ(β̂>j|RjRj,t)
∂Rj,t
|Rj,t=R˜j,t = ĝ ′(β̂>j|R˜j R˜j,t)β̂j|R˜j . (11)
HereRj,t
def
= {X−j,t,Mt−1, Bj,t−1} is the information set which includes p variables, X−j,t def=
{X1,t, X2,t, · · · , Xk,t} are the explanatory variables including the log returns of all financial
institutions except for a financial institution j, k represents the number of financial insti-
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tutions. Bj,t−1 are the firm characteristics calculated from their balance sheet information.
Define the parameters as βj|Rj
def
= {βj|−j, βj|M , βj|Bj}>. Note that there is no time symbol
t in the parameters, since our model is set up based on one fixed window estimation, we
can then apply moving window estimation to estimate all parameters in different win-
dows. We define R˜j,t
def
= {V̂ aR−j,t,τ ,Mt−1,Bj,t−1}, V̂aR−j,t,τ as the estimated VaRs from
(8) for financial institutions except for j in step 1, and β̂j|R˜j
def
= {β̂j|−j, β̂j|M , β̂j|Bj}>. As in
equation (10) CoVaR comprises of not only the influences of financial institutions except
for j, but also incorporates non-linearity reflected in the shape of a link function g(·).
Therefore, we name it ĈoVaR
TENET
which stands for Tail-Event driven NETwork risk
with SIM model.1 D̂j|R˜j is the gradient measuring the marginal effect of covariates eval-
uated at Rj,t = R˜j,t, and the componentwise expression is D̂j|R˜j
def
= {D̂j|−j, D̂j|M , D̂j|Bj}>.
In particular, D̂j|−j allows to measure spillover effects across the financial institutions
and to characterize their evolution as a system represented by a network. Note that in
our network analysis we only include the partial derivatives of institution j with respect
to the other financial institutions (i.e. D̂j|−j). The partial derivatives with respect to
institution’s characteristic variables D̂j|Bj and macro state variables D̂j|M are not includ-
ed. The reason is that we concentrate on spillover effects among firms in the network
analysis.
The term network refers to a (directed) graph with a set of vertices and a set of links, or
edges. We summarize the estimation results in a form of a weighted adjacency matrix.
Let D̂sj|i be one element in D̂
s
j|−j at estimation window s, where j represents one financial
institution as before, i stands for another institution which is one element in the other
financial institutions set −j. Then a weighted adjacency matrix contains absolute values
of D̂sj|i (in upper triangular matrix) and D̂
s
i|j (in lower triangular matrix), where D̂
s
j|i is
the impact from firm i to firm j and D̂si|j means the impact from firm j to firm i. Table
1 shows the adjacency matrix; note that in each window of estimation one has only one
adjacency matrix estimated.
As =

I1 I2 I3 · · · Ik
I1 0 |D̂s1|2| |D̂s1|3| · · · |D̂s1|k|
I2 |D̂s2|1| 0 |D̂s2|3| · · · |D̂s2|k|
I3 |D̂s3|1| |D̂s3|2| 0 · · · |D̂s3|k|
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
Ik |D̂sk|1| |D̂sk|2| |D̂sk|3| · · · 0

Table 1: A k × k adjacency matrix for financial institutions at the sth window.
1For simplicity we omit the subscript j|R˜j ,t,τ in ĈoVaR
TENET
j|R˜j ,t,τ , and write ĈoVaR
TENET
.
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The above k × k matrix As in Table 1 represents total connectedness across variables at
window s, and Ii represents the name of financial institution i. The adjacency matrix, or
a total connectedness matrix, is sparse and off-diagonal since our model (by construction)
does not allow for self-loop effects (namely one variable cannot be regressed on itself).
The rows of this matrix correspond to incoming edges for a variable in a respective row
and the columns correspond to outgoing edges for a variable in a respective column.
2.3.2. Spectral Clustering
In this section, we apply spectral clustering technique, see Shi and Malik (2000), to
detect the time varying risk clusters. The weighted adjacency matrix at window s is
As, the corresponding unweighted matrix is defined by A
u
s , which means that non-zero
values in As are set to be 1s, and zeros are still 0s. We take the symmetrized adjacency
matrix Au>s A
u
s , and the corresponding degree matrix Γ
2
s(a diagonal matrix with diagonal
elements as row(column) sums). The spectral clustering algorithm is launched by looking
at the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the normalized Laplacian matrix Γ−1s A
u>
s A
u
sΓ
−1
s .
We would like to identify for each window risk clusters of financial institutions.
2.4. Step 3: Identification of Systemic Risk Contributions
In the third step, TENET explains systemic risk measures. We define two indices to
identify systemically important financial institutions. The idea is that we would like to
measure the systemic risk relevance of a specific firm by its total in and out connections
weighted by market capitalization.
The Systemic Risk Receiver Index for a firm j is therefore defined as:
SRRj,s
def
= MCj,s{
∑
i∈kINs
(|D̂sj|i| ·MCi,s)}, (12)
the Systemic Risk Emitter Index for a firm j is defined as:
SREj,s
def
= MCj,s{
∑
i∈kOUTs
(|D̂si|j| ·MCi,s)}. (13)
where kINs and k
OUT
s are the sets of firms connected with firm j by incoming and outgoing
links at window s respectively, and MCi,s represents the market capitalization of firm i
at the starting point of window s. |D̂sj|i| and |D̂si|j| are absolute partial derivatives derived
from (11) which represent row (incoming) and column (outgoing) direction connectedness
of firm j as in Table 1. Thus both SRRj,s and SREj,s would take into account the firm
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j’s and its connected firms’ market capitalization as well as its connectedness within our
network.
3. Results
3.1. Data
Since the SIC code can be applied to classify the industries, according to the company
list 2012 of U.S. financial institutions from the NASDAQ webpage and the corresponding
four-digit SIC codes from 6000 to 6799 for these financial institutions in COMPUSTAT
database, we divide the U.S. financial institutions into four groups: (1) depositories
(6000-6099), (2) insurance companies (6300-6499), (3) broker-dealers (6200-6231), (4)
others (the rest codes). For instance, the Goldman Sachs Group is classified as broker-
dealers based on its SIC code 6211. We select top 25 institutions in each group according
to the ranking of their market capitalization (like Billio et al. (2012) they apply a similar
selection method), so that we can compare the difference among industry groups. Our
analysis focuses on the panel of these 100 publicly traded U.S. financial institutions
between 5 January, 2007 and 4 January, 2013, see Table 2 in Appendix C for a complete
list. The weekly price data are available in Yahoo Finance.2
To capture the company specific characteristics we adopt the following variables calcu-
lated from balance sheet information as proposed in AB: 1. leverage, defined as total
assets / total equity (in book values); 2. maturity mismatch, calculated by (short term
debt - cash)/ total liabilities; 3. market-to-book, defined as the ratio of the market to the
book value of total equity; 4. size, calculated by the log of total book equity. The quar-
terly balance sheet information is available on the COMPUSTAT database, and cubic
interpolation is implemented in order to obtain the weekly data.
Apart from the data on the financial companies we use weekly observations of macro
state variables which characterize the general state of the economy. These variables are
defined as follows: (i) the implied volatility index, VIX, reported by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange; (ii) short term liquidity spread denoted as the difference between the
three-month repo rate (available on the Bloomberg database) and the three-month bill
rate (from Federal Reserve Board) to measure short-term liquidity risk; (iii) the changes
in the three-month Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board; (iv) the changes
in the slope of the yield curve corresponding to the yield spread between the ten-year
Treasury rate and the three-month bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board; (v) the
2We appreciate Mr. Lukas Borke, who is a doctoral student in LvB Chair of Statistics, with the help
for optimizing our code and downloading data.
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changes in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate from the
Federal Reserve Board; (vi) the weekly S&P500 index returns from Yahoo finance, and
(vii) the weekly Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate index returns from Yahoo finance.
3.2. Estimation Results
We perform the TENET analysis in three steps: Firstly, the Tail Event VaR of all firms
are estimated. Secondly, the NETwork analysis based on the SIM with variable selection
technique is performed. Finally, the systemically important financial institutions are
identified based on the SRR, SRE indices defined in section 2.4.
To estimate VaR as in (7) and (8), we regress weekly log returns of each institution
on macro state variables at the quantile level τ = 0.05, with the whole period being
T = 266, the number of independent variables is p = 110 (e.g. when JP Morgan is
dependent variable, then the independent variables include 4 firm characteristics of JP
Morgan, 99 other firms’ returns and 7 macro state variables), and the rolling window size
is set to be n = 48 corresponding to one year’s weekly data. (We choose a small window
size for the stationarity of the data process, and our methodology allows to work with
the setting p > n. We acknowledge that by choosing a larger window size, and different
data frequencies, the results may vary. We leave it as a further research topic to study
what is an optimal window size and data frequency in this context. )
Figure 1 is an example of estimated VaR (the thinner red line) for J P Morgan (with
the SIC code 6020). In the second step a CoVaR based risk network is estimated by
applying the SIM with variable selection, see (20) in Appendix A. Figure 1 shows the
ĈoVaR
TENET
(the thicker blue line) of J P Morgan. Then the network analysis induced
by the ĈoVaR
TENET
is shown from Figure 2 to Figure 6. Recall that the adjacency matrix
of Table 1 is constructed from |D̂sj|i| and |D̂si|j|. To aggregate the results over windows,
we take the component-wise sum of the absolute values of the adjacency matrices. With
the aggregation we will be able to understand the risk channels and the relative role of
each firm or each sector in the whole financial network.
For this propose, we define three levels of connectedness: the overall level, the group level
and the firm level connectedness. The overall level of risk is characterized by the total
connectedness of the system and the averaged value of the tuning parameter λ. The total
connectedness of links is defined as TCs = TC
IN
s = TC
OUT
s
def
=
∑k
i=1
∑k
j=1 |D̂sj|i|, where
TCINs and TC
OUT
s are the total incoming and outgoing links in this matrix respectively.
The solid line of Figure 2 shows the evolution of the total connectedness, and the dashed
line of Figure 2 shows the averaged λ values of the CoVaR estimations, where λ is the
estimated penalization parameter, see Appendix A.
11
While at the beginning of 2008 there was lower connectedness and smaller averaged λ,
from the second quarter of 2008 both connectedness and averaged λ began to increase
sharply which corresponds to the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. As
the crisis was unfolding, the system became more heavily interconnected and reached
its peak at the beginning of 2009, the averaged λ stayed at peak level in the middle of
2009, which can be seen as the influence of the European sovereign debt crisis. Then the
downward trend dominated the whole market, and lasted until end of 2010, the financial
institutions were most least connected to each others in second quarter of 2011. From the
third quarter of 2011 the averaged λ began to increase and lasted until beginning of 2012
which can be attributed to the impact of the US debt-ceiling crisis in July 2011. Total
connectedness series increased again in second quarter of 2011. After the middle of 2012,
both the averaged λ and the total connectedness series decreased. Since the evolution of
averaged λ represents the variation of the systemic risk, Borke et al. (2015) propose a
Financial Risk Meter (FRM): http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/frm/index.html.
The group connectedness with respect to incoming links is defined as follows: GCINg,s
def
=∑k
i=1
∑
j∈g |D̂sj|i|, where g = 1, 2, 3, 4 correspond to the four aforementioned industry
groups. The group connectedness with respect to outgoing links is defined as GCOUTg,s
def
=∑
i∈g
∑k
j=1 |D̂sj|i|. Figure 3 shows the incoming links for these four groups. The patterns
of these four groups are almost identical, i.e. there are more links during the end of
2008 and beginning of 2010, during the middle of 2011 and the end of 2012. Only for
group “others”, there are even more links between 2010 and 2012, this maybe because
the heterogeneity of this group: AXP (American Express Company) is a credit card com-
pany, JLL (Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated), CBG (CBRE Group, Inc) and AVHI (AV
Homes, Inc.) are real estate firms, BEN (Franklin Resources, Inc.), IVZ (Invesco Plc)
and AMG (Affiliated Managers Group) are investment management companies, whereas
OCN (Ocwen Financial Corporation) and AGM (Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corpora-
tion) are mortgage loan companies. While the depositories group (solid line) received on
average more risk than the other three groups, the insurance companies (dashed line) are
less influenced by the financial crisis. This can be seen as evidence supporting the report
of Systemic Risk in Insurance – An analysis of insurance and financial stability published
by Geneva Association in 2010 stating that losses in the insurance industry have been
only a sixth of those at banks. In contrast to the incoming links the outgoing links in
Figure 4 are more volatile. It is not surprising that the depositories sector dominates the
others in the outgoing links, i.e. the bank group emits more risk to the system than the
other groups. Broker-dealers and others fluctuate very much in the whole period, but
they send out less risk compared with banks. And the insurers emit averagely less risk
over all periods than the other groups.
Next we turn to analyzing firm level interconnectedness. Firstly we focus on the direc-
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tional connectedness from firm i to the firm j which is defined as follows: DCsj|i
def
= |D̂sj|i|.
The network in Figure 5 shows one example of the firm level directional connectedness
on 12 June 2009 which was in the financial crisis. There are several links emitted from C
(Citigroup) and MS (Morgan Stanley). To make the major connections more clearly, we
apply a hard thresholding to omit the small values. That is, the values of absolute deriva-
tives smaller than the average of the 100 largest absolute partial derivatives are set to be
zeros. Figure 6 is the network after the thresholding. We see that there are several strong
connections, for example, in violet circle the link from JLL to CBG (as we stated before
they are both real estate companies, the connection induced by spillover effects seems
reasonable), and in blue circle from PRU (Principal Financial Group) to HIG (Hartford
Financial Services Group), note that they are both insurances. Moreover there are also a
couple of weak connections from MS (Morgan Stanley) to others. Furthermore, there are
a lot of mutual connections, big banks like BAC (Bank of America) and C (Citigroup) in
red circle, STT (State Street Corporation) and FITB (Fifth Third Bancorp) in red circle,
insurances: LNC (Lincoln National Corporation) and HIG (Hartford Financial Services
Group) in blue circle, different groups, e.g. MS (a broker dealer) and KEY (KeyCorp, a
big bank). We aggregate the directional connectedness by the sum of absolute value of
D̂sj|i and D̂
s
i|j over T = 266 windows. The results for individual firm can be found in Table
3. For WFC (Wells Fargo) the strong incoming links come from STI (SunTrust Banks),
C and BAC, the outgoing links go to USB (U.S. Bancorp), STI and CBSH (Commerce
Bancshares). We also see some pairs of mutual interacting firms, like BAC and C, AIG
(American International Group) and MS. We show the directional connection in τ = 0.95
case as well, the selected firms are mostly different from τ = 0.05 case, which shows that
our method can explain the asymmetric effects on the dependency structure at different
price levels. See Table 3 for more details. The ranking of the directional connectedness is
calculated by the sum of absolute value of D̂sj|i over windows. The first two strongest mu-
tual connections are between JLL and CBG, between LNC and PFG (Principal Financial
Group), see Table 4. Secondly, the firm connectedness with respect to incoming links is
defined as FCINj,s =
∑k
i=1 |D̂sj|i|. Finally, the firm connectedness with respect to outgoing
links is: FCOUTj,s =
∑k
j=1 |D̂sj|i|. From Table 5 and 6 we have the top 10 firms in terms of
incoming links and outgoing links respectively. The most connected firm with incoming
links is AGM (Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation) and the most connected firm
with outgoing links is LNC (Lincoln National Corporation) which is a multiple insurance
and investment management company. We have found out that among the top 10 IN-link
and OUT-link companies, there are several big firms, such as AIG (American Interna-
tional Group) and BAC (Bank of America Corporation) with IN-link, and C (Citigroup)
and MS (Morgan Stanley) with OUT-link. However, there are also firms with moderate
or small sizes e.g. AGM and HBAN (Huntington Bancshares Incorporated) with IN-link,
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and CLMS (Calamos Asset Management) and JNS (Janus Capital Group) with OUT-
link. This is connected with the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) of April 2009
which states that the crisis has shown that not only the banks but also other non-bank
financial intermediaries can be systemically important and their failure can cause desta-
bilizing effects. It also emphasizes that not only the largest financial institutions but
also the smaller but interconnected financial institutions are systemically important and
need to be regulated. “Too connected to fail” is an important issue. However, we see
that small firms tends to have more connections with small firms, such as AGM (market
cap $0.35 billion), which is with the largest sum of incoming links coming from GFIG
(market cap. $0.29 billion), LTS (market cap. $0.22 billion), NEWS (market cap.$0.62
billion), OPY (market cap.$0.21 billion) and HBAN (market cap. $5.2 billion). Despite
the heavy connections in the system, one would still not consider it as highly systemic
risk relevant. Therefore we try to account the three factors in the forthcoming systemic
risk analysis: (1) a firm is big enough, (2) a firm is highly connected with other firms,
(3) the connected firms are relative large in size. Therefore to identify the systemically
important financial institutions, we add a weight of market capitalization in the network.
In addition, based on our network analysis we have the following findings: (1) the con-
nections between institutions tend to increase before the financial crisis, (2) the network
is characterized by numerous heavy links at the peak of a crisis, (3) the connections be-
tween institutions reflected by the absolute value of partial derivatives get weaker as the
financial system stabilizes, (4) the incoming links are far less volatile than the outgoing
links. Whereas banks dominate both incoming and outgoing links, the insurers are less
affected by the financial crisis and exhibit less contribution in terms of risk transmission.
The broker-dealer and others are highly volatile with respect to the risk contribution.
(5) Several institutions with moderate or small sizes and also some non-bank institutions
have higher connectedness, as they are too connected firms. (6) “Too connected” is not
a sufficient condition to detect the importance of the firm. To identify the systemically
important financial institutions we need to find a measure which combines the concepts
“too connected to fail” and “too big to fail”.
While in the first part of step 2 we detect connectedness by applying sum of the absolute
derivatives, in the second part of step 2 we classify the risk clusters by using spectral
clustering. Figure 7 and 8 show the risk clusters in window starting on 6 June 2009 (dur-
ing subprime crisis) and 10 Aug 2012. For Figure 7, the biggest cluster with green color
includes some big banks, like WFC (Wells Fargo), JPM (J P Morgan), BAC (Bank of
America), C (Citigroup), USB (U.S. Bancorp), some insurances: PFG (Principal Finan-
cial Group) and CINF (Cincinnati Financial Corporation), broker-dealers: CME (CME
Group Inc.), SEIC (SEI Investments Company) and MKTX (MarketAxess Holdings),
and others like AXP (American Express Company) and IVZ (Invesco Plc). We see that
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during crisis, WFC (Wells Fargo), JPM (J P Morgan) and C (Citigroup) are very fre-
quently classified into the same cluster. For Figure 8, we see that the clusters are more
widely spreading cross sectors.
In the third step we provide an exact systemic risk measure for each firm based on their
connectedness structure. We consider the market capitalization of each firm as well as
its connected firms with incoming or outgoing links, see equation (12) and (13). Ta-
ble 7 shows the ranking of the top 10 calculated Systemic Risk Receivers: JPM (J P
Morgan), C (Citigroup), WFC (Wells Fargo), BAC (Bank of America), AIG (American
International Group), GS (Goldman Sachs), USB (U.S. Bancorp), MS (Morgan Stanley),
AXP (American Express Company) and COF (Capital One Financial Corp.). As for the
Systemic Risk Emitters, the corresponding ranking is presented in Table 8. Although the
market capitalization of LNC and RF are moderate, they are still ranked in the top 10
largest systemic risk emitters list, as they have many strong outgoing links. Compared
with the result of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) published by Financial
Stability Board 2012, six of our top ten systemic risk receivers appear in this report:
JPM (J P Morgan), C (Citigroup), WFC (Wells Fargo), BAC (Bank of America), GS
(Goldman Sachs), MS (Morgan Stanley), whereas four of our top ten systemic risk emit-
ters appear in this report: C (Citigroup), BAC (Bank of America), WFC (Wells Fargo &
Company) and MS (Morgan Stanley). Also we compare our result with the global sys-
temically important insurers (G-SIIs) published by the Financial Stability Board 2013,
AIG (American International Group) is present in their list. We also compare with the
list of all domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) in U.S. published by Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2013, USB (U.S. Bancorp), AXP (American
Express), COF (Capital One Financial Corp.), RF (Regions Financial Corp.) and STI
(SunTrust Banks, Inc.) are on that list. In total all our top 10 Systemic Risk Receivers
and 8 of our top 10 Systemic Risk Emitters are identified as systemically important fi-
nancial institutions. In this step, we could identify “too big as well as too connected”
firms which need to be well supervised and regulated.
3.3. Model Validation
3.3.1. Comparison with linear models
To evaluate the accuracy of the estimated VaR in the first step, we count the firms’ VaRs
violations, which is meant to be the situation when the stock losses exceed the estimated
VaRs. In Figure 1 there is no violation in the series of estimated VaR (thinner red line) for
J P Morgan. The average violation rate for 100 financial institutions is τ̂ = 0.0006, which
is much smaller than the nominal rate τ = 0.05. Since our observations are T = 266, most
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of estimated VaRs do not have violation, the CaViaR test for VaR can not be performed.
In step 2 we apply the SIM with variable selection to calculate CoVaR. We also compare
our results with linear quantile LASSO models in this step to justify the necessity of
having a nonlinear model. The benchmark linear LASSO model is written as follows:
Xj,t = αj|Rj + β
L>
j|RjRj,t + εj,t, (14)
ĈoVaR
L
j|R˜j ,t,τ
def
= α̂j|R˜j + β̂
L>
j|R˜j R˜j,t, (15)
where αj|Rj is a constant term, Rj,t, X−j,t, Bj,t−1,V̂aR−j,t,τ and R˜j,t are defined in section
2.3. The parameters βLj|Rj
def
= {βLj|−j, βLj|M , βLj|Bj}>, and β̂Lj|Rj
def
= {β̂Lj|−j, β̂Lj|M , β̂Lj|Bj}>
which are estimated by using linear quantile regression with variable selection. Then
ĈoVaR
L
can be simply calculated.3
Recall that we denote our estimated CoVaR in step 2 as ĈoVaR
TENET
. Now we compare
the performance of ĈoVaR
TENET
and ĈoVaR
L
. In Figure 1 the thinner green line rep-
resents the ĈoVaR
L
of J P Morgan, there is 1 violation during the whole time period of
T = 266, whereas there are 4 violations in the estimated ĈoVaR
TENET
series in Figure
1 (thicker blue line). We apply the CaViaR test proposed by Berkowitz et al. (2011).
While the p-values of ĈoVaR
TENET
in overall period is 0.63, ĈoVaR
L
is only 0.37. Also
in crisis period (from 15 September 2008 to 26 February 2010) ĈoVaR
TENET
performs
better than ĈoVaR
L
, see Table 9 for more details.
Further, we examine the shape of the link functions in the crisis period as well as in the
period of relative financial stability. We find out that for almost all firms in a financial
crisis period, the link functions are in most of the windows, non-linear, while in a stable
period, the link functions tend to be more linear. Take the ĈoVaR
TENET
for J P Morgan
as an example. The left panel of Figure 9 displays the shape of the estimated link function
in one window in crisis time and its 95% confidence bands, see Carroll and Ha¨rdle (1989).
In a stable period one observes in some windows the shape of the link function as on
the right panel of Figure 9. It confirms Chao et al. (2015)’s results stating that the
nonlinear model performs better especially in a financial crisis period. We conclude the
outperformance of our method over the linear model conditional on the network effects.
3.3.2. Pre-Crisis analysis
In this part we would like to test whether our model can detect in advance financial firms
which had knock-on effects for the financial systems. We consider mainly five financial
firms: FNM (Fannie Mae), FRE (Freddie Mac), LEH (Lehman Brothers), MER (Merrill
3For simplicity we omit the subscript j|R˜j ,t,τ in ĈoVaR
L
j|R˜j ,t,τ , and write ĈoVaR
L
.
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Lynch) and WB (Wachovia Corp.). The weekly historical returns of these firms are
available on the CRSP database. The above mentioned exercise has been carried out
again with these five firms (a total of 105 firms in this case). The time period is from 7
December 2007 to 12 September 2008 includes 41 estimates in moving windows. Firstly
we show the results from step 2, which checks the connectedness of these firms. Table
10 shows the ranking of total incoming links, where FRE receives most incoming links
from other firms, and FNM is ranked as the 4th. From the Table 11 it can be seen that
the firm with the strongest outgoing links is FNM. Moreover FRE is ranked as the third
one, and LEH is ranked in the 7th place. Table 12 presents the direct incoming links and
outgoing links in terms of other firms. Besides, FRE and FNM is the most connected
pair, they send risk to each other. FNM dominates the incoming link tables, which can
also be confirmed in Table 10. According to the selected variables in step 2, we perform
the methodology in step 3. Table 13 shows the ranking of the systemic risk receivers
according to our SRR values, where WB is third largest risk receiver, FRE is ranked as
the sixth, AIG, MER, FNM follow subsequently, and LEH is ranked as the 12th. The
systemic risk emitters according to our SRE values are presented in Table 14. We see
that FNM is the biggest risk emitter, WB is the third one, FRE and LEH are 4th and
5th risk transmitters and the ranking of MER is 8th. In summary, all these five firms
are identified as systemically important institutions which shows the validation of our
methodology. Finally, we compare our ranking of systemic risk emitters in Table 14 with
Hautsch et al. (2015) and Brownlees and Engle (2015). In the pre-crisis results of Hautsch
et al. (2015), they involve five firms in the case study, i.e. AIG, FNM, FRE, LEH and
MER. MER is not in their top ten list, whereas we did not identify AIG in our top ten
list. Compared with the pre-crisis results with Brownlees and Engle (2015), where the
firm Bear Stearns is also involved in their analysis. Their rankings of the aforementioned
five firms between 2007 and 2008 are very similar with ours.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we propose TENET based on a semiparametric quantile regression frame-
work to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions conditional to their market
capitalization and interconnectedness in tails. The semiparametric model allows for more
flexible modeling of the relationship between the variables. This is especially justified in
a (ultra) high-dimensional setting when the assumption of linearity is not likely to hold.
In order to face these challenges statistically we estimate a SIM in a generalized quantile
regression framework while simultaneously performing variable selection. (Ultra) high
dimensional setting allows us to include more variables into the analysis.
Our empirical results show that there is growing interconnectedness during the period of
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a financial crisis, and a network-based measure reflecting the connectivity. Moreover, by
including more variables into the analysis we can investigate the overall performance of
different financial sectors, depositories, insurance, broker-dealers, and others. Estimation
results show a relatively high connectivity of depository industry in the financial crisis.
We also observe strong non-linear relationships between the variables, especially, in the
period of relative financial instability. The Systemic Risk Receivers and Systemic Risk
Emitters can be simply identified based on their connectedness structure and market
capitalization. We conclude that both the largest systemic risk receivers and the largest
systemic risk emitters are systemically important.
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5. Appendix A: Statistical Methodology
Let us denote Xt ∈ Rp as p dimensional variables Rj,t in (9), p can be very large, namely
of an exponential rate. We also drop the subscripts of the coefficients βj|Rj , as we focus
on one regression. The SIM of (9) is then rewritten as:
Yt = g(X
>
t β
∗) + εt, (16)
where {Xt, εt} are strong mixing processes, g(·): R1 → R1 is an unknown smooth link
function, β∗ is the vector of index parameters. Regressors Xt can be the lagged variables
of Yt. For the identification, we assume that ‖β∗‖2 = 1, and the first component of β∗ is
positive. We assume that there are q non-zero components in β∗.
Note that (16) can be formulated in a location model and identified in a quasi maximum
likelihood framework: the direction β∗ (for known g(·)) is the solution of
min
β
E ρτ{Yt − g(X>t β)}, (17)
with loss function
ρτ (u) = τu1(u > 0) + (1− τ)u1(u < 0), (18)
E[ψτ{Yt − g(X>t β∗)}|Xt] = 0 a.s.
where ψτ (·) is the derivative (a subgradient) of ρτ (·) . It can be reformulated as F−1εt|Xt(τ) =
0.
The model is similar to the location scale model considered in Franke et al. (2014). Note
that it may be extended to a quantile AR-ARCH type of single index model,
Yt = g(X
>
t β
∗) + σ(X>t γ
∗)εt (19)
To estimate the shape of a link function g(·) and β∗, we adopt minimum average con-
trast estimation approach (MACE) with penalization outlined in Fan et al. (2013). The
estimation of β∗ and g(·) is as follows:
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βˆτ , gˆ(·) def= arg min
β,g(·)
−Ln(β, g(·))
= arg min
β,g(·)
n−1
n∑
j=1
n∑
t=1
ρτ
{
Xt − g(β>Xj)− g′(β>Xj)X>tjβ
}
ωtj(β)
+
p∑
l=1
γλ(|βl|), (20)
where ωtj(β)
def
=
Kh(X
>
tjβ)∑n
t=1Kh(X
>
tjβ)
, Kh(·) = h−1K(·/h), K(·) is a kernel e.g. Gaussian
kernel, h is a bandwidth and Ln(β, g(·)) is defined as −n−1
n∑
j=1
n∑
t=1
ρτ
{
Xt − g(β>Xj) −
g′(β>Xj)X>tjβ
}
ωtj(β) +
∑p
l=1 γλ(|βl|). Since the data is not equally spaced we choose a
bandwidth h based on k-nearest neighbour procedure (See Ha¨rdle et al. (2004) and Carroll
and Ha¨rdle (1989)). The optimal k, number of neighbours, are selected based on a cross-
validation criterion. The implementation involves an iteration between estimating β∗ and
g(·), with a consistent initial estimate for β∗, Wu et al. (2010). Xtj = Xt − Xj, θ ≥ 0,
and γλ(t) is some non-decreasing function concave for t ∈ [0,+∞) with a continuous
derivative on (0,+∞). Please note that this MACE functional (with respect to g(·))
(20) is in fact only a finite dimensional optimization problem since the minimum over
g(·) is to be determined at aj = g(β>Xj), bj = g′(β>Xj). There are several approaches
for the choice of the penalty function. These approaches can be classified based on the
properties desired for an optimal penalty function, namely, unbiasedness, sparsity and
continuity. The L1 penalty approach known as least absolute shrinkage and selection
operator (LASSO) is proposed for mean regression by Tibshirani (1996). Numerous
studies further adapt LASSO to a quantile regression framework, Yu et al. (2003), Li and
Zhu (2008), Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011), among others. While achieving sparsity
the L1-norm penalty tends to over-penalize the large coefficients as the LASSO penalty
increases linearly in the magnitude of its argument, and, thus, may introduce bias to
estimation. As a remedy to this problem the adaptive LASSO estimation procedure was
proposed (Zou (2006); Zheng et al. (2013)). Another approach to alleviate the LASSO
bias was proposed by Fan and Li (2001) known as Smoothly Clipped Absolute Deviation
(SCAD):
γλ(t) =

λ|t| for |t| ≤ λ,
−(t2 − 2aλ|t|+ λ2)/2(a− 1) for λ < |t| ≤ aλ,
(a+ 1)λ2/2 for |t| > aλ,
where λ > 0 and a > 2. Note that for λ =∞, this is exactly LASSO.
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As for selecting λ, there are two common ways: data-driven generalized cross-validation
criterion (GCV) and likelihood-based Schwartz, or Bayesian information criterion-type
criteria (SIC, or BIC), Schwarz (1978); Koenker et al. (1994), and their further modifi-
cations. The most commonly used criterion is GCV, however, it has been shown that it
leads to an overfitted model. Therefore, we employ a modified BIC-type model selection
criteria proposed by Wang et al. (2007) and use GCV criterion only to verify whether
GCV and BIC diverge significantly. We need to introduce some more notation to present
our theoretical results.
Define βˆτ
def
= (βˆ>τ(1), βˆ
>
τ(2))
> as the estimator for β∗ def= (β∗>(1) , β
∗>
(2))
> attained by the loss
in (20). Here βˆτ(1) and βˆτ(2) refer to the first q components and the remaining p − q
components of βˆτ respectively. The same notional logic applies to β
∗. For Xt, X(1)t
corresponds to β∗>(1) and X(0)t corresponds to β
∗>
(2) . If in the iterations, we have the initial
estimator βˆ
(0)
(1) as a
√
n/q consistent one for β∗(1) , we will obtain, with a very high
probability, an oracle estimator of the following type, say β˜τ = (β˜
>
τ(1),0
>)>, since the
oracle knows the true model M∗ def= {l : β∗l 6= 0}. The following theorem shows that the
penalized estimator enjoys the oracle property. Define βˆ0 ∈ Rp as the minimizer with the
same loss in (20) but within subspace {β ∈ Rp : βMc∗ = 0}.
With all the above definitions and conditions, see Appendix, we present the following
theorems.
THEOREM 5.1. Under Conditions 1-7, the estimators βˆ0 and βˆτ exist and coincide
on a set with probability tending to 1. Moreover,
P(βˆ0 = βˆτ ) ≥ 1− (p− q) exp(−C ′nα) (21)
for a positive constant C ′, where βˆ0 is the “ideal” estimator with non-zero elements
correctly specified.
This theorem implies the sign consistency.
THEOREM 5.2. Under Conditions 1-7, we have
‖βˆτ(1) − β∗(1)‖ = Op{(Dn + n−1/2)
√
q} (22)
For any unit vector b in Rq, we have
b>C1/20(1)C
−1/2
1(1) C
1/2
0(1)
√
n(βˆτ(1) − β∗(1)) L−→ N(0, 1) (23)
where C1(1)
def
= E{E{ψ2τ (εt)|Zt}[g′(Zt)]2[E(X(1)t|Zt) − X(1)t][E(X(1)t|Zt) − X(1)t]>}, and
C0(1)
def
= E{∂ Eψτ (εt)|Zt}{[g′(Zt)]2(E(X(1)t|Zt) − X(1)t)(E(X(1)t|Zt) − X(1)t)}>. Note that
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E(X(1)t|Zt) denotes a p× 1 vector, and Zt def= X>t β∗, ψτ (εt) is a choice of the subgradient
of ρτ (εt) and
σ2τ
def
= E[ψτ (εt)]
2/[∂ Eψτ (εt)]
2, where
∂ Eψτ (·)|Zt = ∂ Eψτ (εt − v)
2|Zt
∂v2
∣∣∣
v=0
. (24)
Let us now look at the distribution of gˆ(·) and gˆ′(·), estimators of g(·), g′(·).
THEOREM 5.3. Under Conditions 1-7, for any interior point z = x>β∗, fZ(z) is the
density of Zt, t = 1, . . . , n, if nh
3 →∞ and h→ 0, we have
√
nh
√
fZ(z)/(ν0σ2τ )
{
ĝ(x>β̂)− g(x>β∗)− 1
2
h2g′′(x>β∗)µ2∂ Eψτ
(
εt
)} L−→ N (0, 1) ,
Also, we have
√
nh3
√
{fZ(z)µ22}/(ν2σ2τ )
{
ĝ′(x>β̂)− g′(x>β∗)
} L−→ N (0, 1) .
The dependence doesn’t have any impact on the rate of the convergence of our non-
parametric link function. As the degree of the dependence is measured by the mixing
coefficient, it is weak enough such that Condition 7 is satisfied. In fact we assume an
exponential decaying rate here, which implies the (A.4) in Kong et al. (2010).
6. Appendix B: Proof
Condition 1. The kernel K(·) is a continuous symmetric function. The link function
g(·) ∈ C2, let µj def=
∫
ujK(u)du and νj
def
=
∫
ujK2(u)du, j = 0, 1, 2.
Condition 2. The derivative (or a subgradient) of ρτ (x), satisfies Eψτ (εt) = 0 and
inf |v|≤c ∂ Eψτ (εt − v) = C1 where ∂ Eψτ (εt − v) is the partial derivative with respect
to v, and C1 is a constant.
Condition 3. The density fZ(z) of Zt = β
∗>Xt is bounded with bounded absolute con-
tinuous first-order derivatives on its support. Assume E{ψτ (εt|Xt)} = 0 a.s., which
means for a quantile loss we have F−1εt|Xt(τ) = 0. Let X(1)t denote the sub-vector of
Xt consisting of its first q elements. Let Zt
def
= X>t β
∗ and Ztj
def
= Zt − Zj . Define
C1(1)
def
= E{E{ψ2τ (εt)|Zt}[g′(Zt)]2[E(X(1)t|Zt) − X(1)t][E(X(1)t|Zt) − X(1)t]>}, and C0(1) def=
E{∂ Eψτ (εt)|Zt}{[g′(Zt)]2(E(X(1)t|Zt)−X(1)t)(E(X(1)t|Zt)−X(1)t)}>, and the matrix C1(1)
satisfies 0 < L1 ≤ λmin(C0(1)) ≤ λmax(C0(1)) ≤ L2 <∞ for positive constants L1 and L2.
A constant c0 > 0 exists such that
∑n
t=1{‖X(1)t‖/
√
n}2+c0 → 0, with 0 < c0 < 1.
vtj
def
= Yt − aj − bjX>tjβ. Also, a constant C3 exists such that for all β close to β∗
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(‖β − β∗‖ ≤ C3), let X(1)tj denote the subvector of Xtj consisting of its first q compo-
nents, X(0)tj denote the subvector of Xtj consisting of its first p− q components:
‖
∑
t
∑
j
X(0)tjωtjX
>
(1)tj∂ Eψτ (vtj)‖2,∞ = Op(n1−α1).
Condition 4. The penalty parameter λ is chosen such that λ = O(n−1/2), with Dn def=
max{dl : l ∈ M∗} = O(nα1−α2/2λ) = O(n−1/2), dl def= γλ(|β∗l |), M∗ = {l : β∗l 6= 0} be
the true model. Furthermore assume qh→ 0 and h−1√q/n = O(1) as n goes to infinity,
q = O(nα2), p = O{exp(nδ)}, nh3 → ∞ and h → 0. Also, 0 < δ < α < α2/2 < 1/2,
α2/2 < α1 < 1.
Condition 5. The error term εt satisfies Var(εt) < ∞. Assume that for any integer
m = 1, · · · ,∞
sup
t
E
∣∣ψmτ (εt)/m!∣∣ ≤ s0Mm
sup
t
E
∣∣ψmτ (xtj)/m!∣∣ ≤ s0Mm
where s0 and M are constants, and ψτ (·) is the derivative (a subgradient) of ρτ (·).
Condition 6. The conditional density function f(εt|Zt = z) is bounded and absolutely
continuously differentiable.
Conditions 7. {Xtj, εt}t=∞t=−∞ is a strong mixing process for any j. Moreover, let m1 and
m2 be constants, positive constants cm1 and cm2 exists such that the α−mixing coefficient
for every j ∈ {1, · · · , p},
α(l) ≤ exp(−cm1lcm2), (25)
where cm2 > 2α.
Recall (20) and βˆ0 as the minimizer with the loss
L˜n(β)
def
=
n∑
j=1
n∑
t=1
ρτ
(
Yt − a∗j − b∗jX>tjβ
)
ωtj(β
∗) + n
p∑
l=1
dl|βl|,
but within the subspace {β ∈ Rp : βMc∗ = 0}, and a∗j = g(β∗>Xj), b∗j = g′(β∗>Xj). The
following lemma assures the consistency of βˆ0,
LEMMA 6.1. Under Conditions 1-7, recall dj = γλ
(|β∗j |), we have that
‖βˆ0 − β∗‖ = Op
(√
q/n+ ‖d(1)‖
)
(26)
where d(1) is the subvector of d = (d1, · · · , dp)> which contains q elements corresponding
to the non-zero β∗(1).
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PROOF. Note that the last p− q elements of both βˆ0 and β∗ are zero, so it is sufficient
to prove ‖βˆ0(1) − β∗(1)‖ = Op
(√
q/n+ ‖d(1)‖
)
.
Following Fan et al. (2013), it is not hard to prove that for γn = O(1):
P
[
inf
‖u‖=1
{
L˜n(β
∗
(1) + γnu, 0) > L˜n(β
∗)
}]→ 1.
Then a minimizer inside the ball exists {β(1) : ‖β(1) − β∗(1)‖ ≤ γn}. Construct γn → 0
so that for a sufficiently large constant B0: γn > B0 ·
(√
q/n + ‖d(1)‖
)
. Then by the
local convexity of L˜n(β(1),0) near β
∗
(1), a unique minimizer exists inside the ball {β(1) :
‖β(1) − β∗(1)‖ ≤ γn} with probability tending to 1.
Recall that Xt = (X(1)t, X(0)t) and M∗ = {1, . . . , q} is the set of indices at which β are
non-zero.
Lemma 1 shows the consistency of βˆ0, and we need to show further that βˆ0 is the unique
minimizer in Rp on a set with probability tending to 1.
LEMMA 6.2. Under conditions 1-7, minimizing the loss function L˜n(β) has a unique
global minimizer βˆτ = (βˆ
>
τ(1), βˆ
>
τ(2))
> = (βˆ>τ(1),0
>)>, if and only if on a set with probability
tending to 1,
n∑
j=1
n∑
t=1
ψτ
(
Yt − aˆj − bˆjX>tj βˆτ
)
bˆjX(1)tjωtj(β
∗) + nd(1) ◦ sign(βˆτ ) = 0 (27)
‖z(βˆτ )‖∞ ≤ n, (28)
where
z(βˆτ )
def
= d−1(0) ◦
{ n∑
j=1
n∑
t=1
b∗jψτ
(
Yt − a∗j − b∗jX>tj βˆτ
)
X(0)tjωtj(βˆτ )
}
(29)
where ◦ stands for multiplication element-wise.
PROOF. According to the definition of βˆτ , it is clear that βˆ(1) already satisfies condition
(27). Therefore we only need to verify condition (28). To prove (28), a bound for
n∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
b∗jψτ
(
Yi − a∗j − b∗jX>ijβ∗
)
ωijX(0)ij (30)
is needed, note that to be consistent with notations for U− statistics we use j instead of
t within this proof. Define the following kernel function
hd(Xi, a
∗
j , b
∗
j , Yi, Xj, a
∗
i , b
∗
i , Yj)
=
n
2
{
b∗jψτ
(
Yi − a∗j − b∗jX>ijβ∗
)
ωijX(0)ij + b
∗
iψτ
(
Yj − a∗i − b∗iX>ijβ∗
)
ωjiX(0)ji
}
d
,
24
where {.}d denotes the dth element of a vector, d = 1, . . . , p− q.
According to Borisov and Volodko (2009), based on Condition 5:
Define Un,d
def
= 1
n(n−1)
∑
1≤i<j≤n hd(Xi, a
∗
j , b
∗
j , Yi, Xj, a
∗
i , b
∗
i , Yj) as the U− statistics for (30).
We have, with sufficient large cm2 in Condition 7.
P{|Un,d − EUn,d| > ε} ≤ cm3 exp(cm5ε/(cm3 + cm4ε1/2n−1/2))
where cm3, cm4, cm5 are constants. Moreover, let ε = O(n1/2+α) and m6 be a constant, as
α < 1/2, we can further have,
P({|Un,d − EUn,d| > ε}) ≤ cm3 exp(−cm6ε/2),
Define
Fn,d
def
= (n)−1
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bjψτ
(
Yi − a∗j − b∗jX>ijβ∗
)
ωijX(0)ij,
also it is not hard to derive that Un,d = Fn,dn/(n− 1).
It then follows that
P(|Fn,d − EFn,d| > ε) = P(|Un,d − EUn,d|(n− 1)/n > ε)
≤ 2 exp(−Cnα+1/2)
Define An = {‖Fn − EFn‖∞ ≤ ε}, thus
P(An) ≥ 1−
p−q∑
d=1
P(|Fn,d − EFn,d| > ε) ≥ 1− 2(p− q) exp
(−Cnα+1/2).
Finally we get that on the set An,
‖z(βˆ0)‖∞ ≤ ‖d−1Mc∗ ◦ Fn‖∞ + ‖d−1Mc∗ ◦
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bj
[
ψτ
(
Yt − a∗j − b∗jX>ij βˆ0
)
−ψτ
(
Yt − a∗j − b∗jX>ijβ∗
)]
ωijX(0)ij‖∞
≤ O(n1/2+α/λ+ ‖d−1Mc∗ ◦
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂ Eψτ (vij)bjX
>
(1)ij(βˆ(1) − β∗(1))ωtjX(0)ij‖∞),
where vij is between Yi − a∗j − b∗jX>ijβ∗ and Yi − a∗j − b∗jX>ij βˆ0. From Lemma 1,
‖βˆ0 − β∗(1)‖2 = Op
(
‖d(1)‖+√q/
√
n
)
.
Choosing ‖∑i∑j X(0)ijωijX>(1)ij∂ Eψτ (vij)‖2,∞ = Op(n1−α1), q = O(nα2), λ = O(√q/n) =
25
n−1/2+α2/2, 0 < α2 < 1, ‖d(1)‖ = O(√qDn) = O(nα2/2Dn)
n−1‖z(βˆ0)‖∞ = O{n−1λ−1(n1/2+α + n1−α1√q/
√
n+ ‖d(1)‖n1−α1)}
= O(n−α2/2+α + n−α1 + n−α1+α2/2Dn/λ),
conditions 4 ensures Dn = O(nα1−α2/2λ), and let 0 < δ < α < α2/2 < 1/2, α2/2 < α1 < 1,
with rate p = O{exp(nδ)}, then (n)−1‖z(βˆ0)‖∞ = Op(1).
Proof of Theorem 1 . The results follows from Lemma 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1, βˆτ(1) = β(1) almost surely. It then follows from
Lemma 2 that
‖βˆτ(1) − β∗(1)‖ = Op{(Dn + n−1/2)
√
q}.
This completes the first part of the theorem. The other part of proof follows largely from
Fan et al. (2013).
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Figure 1: log return of J P Morgan (black points), V̂aR (thinner red line), ĈoVaR
TENET
(thicker blue
line), and ĈoVaR
L
(thinner green line) for J P Morgan, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 266.
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Figure 2: Total connectedness (solid blue line) and average lambda (dashed black line) of 100 financial
institutions from 20071207 to 20130105, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 266.
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Figure 3: Incoming links for four industry groups. Depositories: solid red line, Insurances: dashed
blue line, Broker-Dealers: dotted green line, Others: dash-dot violet line. τ = 0.05, window size n = 48,
T = 266.
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Figure 4: Outgoing links for four industry groups. Depositories: solid red line, Insurances: dashed
blue line, Broker-Dealers: dotted green line, Others: dash-dot violet line. τ = 0.05, window size n = 48,
T = 266.
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Figure 5: A circular network representation of a weighted adjacency matrix without the thresholding.
Depositories: clockwise 25 firms from WFC to SBNY (upper red), Insurance: clockwise 25 firms from
AIG to HCC (right blue), Broker-Dealers: clockwise 25 firms from GS to CLMS (lower green), Others:
clockwise 25 firms from AXP to NICK (left violet), date: 20090612, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48.
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Figure 6: A circular network representation of a weighted adjacency matrix after the thresholding
(the values smaller than average of first 100 largest partial derivatives are set to be 0s). Depositories:
clockwise 25 firms from WFC to SBNY (upper red), Insurance: clockwise 25 firms from AIG to HCC
(right blue), Broker-Dealers: clockwise 25 firms from GS to CLMS (lower green), Others: clockwise 25
firms from AXP to NICK (left violet), date: 20090612, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48.
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Figure 7: A circular network representation of an unweighted adjacency matrix (1 and 0 representation
of this matrix) without thresholding. Green, blue, red, black represent four different risk clusters, and
grey represents unconnected firm. Date: 20090612, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48.
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Figure 8: A circular network representation of an unweighted adjacency matrix (1 and 0 representation
of this matrix) without thresholding. Green, blue, red, black represent four different risk clusters, and
grey represents unconnected firm. Date: 20120810, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48.
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Rank From Ticker To Ticker Sum
1 JLL (Jones Lang LaSalle) CBG (CBRE Group) 140.39
2 CBG (CBRE Group) JLL (Jones Lang LaSalle ) 116.86
3 LNC (Lincoln National Corp.) PFG (Principal Financial Group) 96.78
4 PFG (Principal Financial Group) LNC (Lincoln National Corp.) 90.43
5 C (Citigroup) AIG (American International Group) 82.03
6 JNS (Janus Capital Group) WDR (Waddell & Reed Financial) 65.75
7 RF (Regions Financial) HBAN (Huntington Bancshares) 60.86
8 STI (SunTrust Banks) FITB (Fifth Third Bancorp.) 57.95
9 LNC (Lincoln National Corp.) MET (MetLife) 57.35
10 MS (Morgan Stanley) GS (Goldman Sachs Group) 55.98
Table 4: Top 10 directional connectedness from one financial institution to another. The ranking is
calculated by the sum of absolute value of the partial derivatives, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 266.
Rank Ticker of IN IN-Sum Rank of MC (Value)
1 AGM (Federal Agricultural Mortgage) 235.55 89 (3.52E+08)
2 AIG (American International Group) 230.46 8 (4.82E+10)
3 HIG (Hartford Financial Services Group) 225.46 37 (9.24E+09)
4 CBG (CBRE Group) 221.86 32 (1.28E+10)
5 FITB (Fifth Third Bancorp) 202.00 30 (1.31E+10)
6 STI (SunTrust Banks) 199.85 29 (1.44E+10)
7 HBAN (Huntington Bancshares) 196.29 51 (5.23E+09)
8 BAC (Bank of America Corp.) 192.11 3 (1.05E+11)
9 C (Citigroup) 191.50 3 (1.05E+11)
10 LNC (Lincoln National Corp.) 189.59 43 (6.67E+09)
Table 5: Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to Incoming links calculated by the sum of
absolute value of the partial derivatives, and the rank of market capitalization (MC) in this 100 financial
institutions list in 2012 is also shown in this table, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 266.
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Rank Ticker of OUT OUT-Sum Rank of MC (Value)
1 LNC (Lincoln National Corp.) 1129.38 43 (6.67E+09)
2 C (Citigroup) 1097.93 3 (1.05E+11)
3 MS (Morgan Stanley) 626.12 37 (9.24E+09)
4 CBG (CBRE Group) 597.83 32 (1.28E+10)
5 RF (Regions Financial) 568.71 36 (9.30E+09)
6 JNS (Janus Capital Group) 558.06 76 (1.57E+09)
7 CLMS (Calamos Asset Management) 514.80 99 (1.94E+08)
8 HIG (Hartford Financial Services Group) 499.04 37 (9.24E+09)
9 ZION (Zions Bancorp.) 472.18 63 (3.72E+09)
10 AGM (Federal Agricultural Mortgage) 349.11 90 (3.52E+08)
Table 6: Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to Outgoing links calculated by the sum of
absolute value of the partial derivatives, and the rank of market capitalization (MC) in this 100 financial
institutions list in 2012 is also shown in this table, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 266.
Rank Ticker SRR Rank of MC (Value)
1 JPM (J P Morgan Chase & Co) 4.63E+21 2 (1.55E+11)
2 C (Citigroup) 3.13E+21 3 (1.05E+11)
3 WFC (Wells Fargo & Company) 3.03E+21 1 (1.75E+11)
4 BAC (Bank of America) 2.90E+21 3 (1.05E+11)
5 AIG (American International Group) 1.15E+21 8 (4.82E+10)
6 GS (Goldman Sachs Group) 1.00E+21 8 (5.53E+10)
7 USB (U.S. Bancorp) 8.57E+20 6 (6.03E+10)
8 MS (Morgan Stanley) 8.29E+20 12 (3.21E+10)
9 AXP (American Express Company) 7.71E+20 5 (6.26E+10)
10 COF (Capital One Financial Corp.) 6.64E+20 10 (3.39E+10)
Table 7: Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to the index of Systemic Risk Receiver (SRR),
the rank of market capitalization (MC) and their values (in brackets) of this 100 financial institutions in
2012 are also shown in this table.
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Rank Ticker SRE Rank of MC (Value)
1 C (Citigroup) 1.18E+22 3 (1.05E+11)
2 BAC (Bank of America) 3.89E+21 3 (1.05E+11)
3 MS (Morgan Stanley) 2.11E+21 12 (3.21E+10)
4 WFC (Wells Fargo & Company) 1.37E+21 1 (1.75E+11)
5 AIG (American International Group) 7.01E+20 8 (4.82E+10)
6 COF (Capital One Financial Corp.) 6.18E+20 10 (3.39E+10)
7 LNC (Lincoln National Corp.) 5.10E+20 43 (6.67E+09)
8 RF (Regions Financial Corp.) 4.10E+20 36 (9.30E+09)
9 STI (SunTrust Banks, Inc.) 4.03E+20 29 (1.44E+10)
10 CBG (CBRE Group, Inc.) 3.73E+20 32 (1.28E+10)
Table 8: Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to the index of Systemic Risk Emitter (SRE),
the rank of market capitalization (MC) and their values (in brackets) of this 100 financial institutions in
2012 are also shown in this table.
Average p-value of CaViaR test ĈoVaR
TENET
ĈoVaR
L
The overall period 0.63(0.33) 0.37(0.41)
The crisis Period 0.72(0.24) 0.51(0.42)
Table 9: The average p-values of CaViaR test in overall and crisis periods for ĈoVaR
TENET
, and the
ĈoVaR
L
, the standard deviations are given in the brackets.
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Figure 9: Left: the estimated link function (ĈoVaR
TENET
of J P Morgan) (solid line) with h = 0.05,
and the estimated index (points), time period: 20081003-20090828. Right: the estimated link function
(ĈoVaR
TENET
of J P Morgan) (solid line) with h = 0.03, and estimated the index (points), time period:
20100604-20110506. τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, 95% confidence bands (dashed lines).
Rank Ticker of IN IN-Sum Value of MC
1 FRE (Freddie Mac) 43.95 2.20E+10
2 OCN (Ocwen Financial Corp.) 40.12 3.87E+08
3 NDAQ (The NASDAQ OMX Group) 39.54 6.69E+09
4 FNM (Fannie Mae) 34.07 3.80E+10
5 CACC (Credit Acceptance Corp.) 32.97 5.39E+08
6 KEY (KeyCorp) 32.49 7.98E+09
7 EV (Eaton Vance Corp.) 30.58 3.73E+09
8 PRAA (Portfolio Recovery Associates) 30.07 5.92E+08
9 HBAN (Huntington Bancshares) 29.92 3.36E+09
10 PJC (Piper Jaffray Companies) 29.66 5.75E+08
Table 10: Pre-Crisis analysis. Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to Incoming links calcu-
lated by the sum of absolute value of the partial derivatives, the values of market capitalization (MC) in
2008 are also shown in this table, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 41.
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Rank Ticker of OUT OUT-Sum Value of MC
1 FNM (Fannie Mae) 252.43 3.80E+10
2 CBG (CBRE Group, Inc.) 157.93 4.04E+09
3 FRE (Freddie Mac) 144.44 2.20E+10
4 WRLD (World Acceptance Corp.) 89.05 5.11E+08
5 CLMS (Calamos Asset Management) 81.13 3.79E+08
6 NEWS (NewStar Financial) 80.71 2.91E+08
7 LEH (Lehman Brothers) 75.73 3.50E+10
8 NNI (Nelnet, Inc.) 70.79 6.03E+08
9 PRAA (Portfolio Recovery Associates) 69.84 5.93E+08
10 C (Citigroup) 68.79 1.03E+11
Table 11: Pre-Crisis analysis. Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to Outgoing links calcu-
lated by the sum of absolute value of the partial derivatives, the values of market capitalization (MC) in
2008 are also shown in this table, τ = 0.05, window size n = 48, T = 41.
Rank Ticker Received link from Transmitted link to
1 FRE (Freddie Mac) FNM, NS, OCN FNM, FNF, SEIC
2 FNM(Fannie Mae) FRE, CBG, HBAN FRE, LEH, WB
3 LEH (Lehman Brothers) FNM, WRLD, PJC AGM, PJC, KEY
4 MER (Merrill Lynch) FNM, LEH, NEWS AVHI, JPM, MS
5 WB (Wachovia Corp.) FNM, C, CMA CMA, BEN, C
Table 12: Pre-Crisis analysis. The five defaulted firms are ranked randomly, the received links from
other firms and transmitted links to other firms are shown correspondingly. Note that only the first three
most influential firms are listed for each ticker, τ = 0.05, n = 48, T = 41.
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Rank Ticker Value of SRR Value of MC
1 WFC (Wells Fargo & Company) 8.47E+22 1.24E+11
2 C (Citigroup) 8.01E+22 1.03E+11
3 WB (Wachovia Corp.) 6.61E+22 7.30E+10
4 JPM (J P Morgan Chase & Co) 5.26E+22 1.48E+11
5 BAC (Bank of America) 4.20E+22 1.54E+11
6 FRE (Freddie Mac) 3.67E+22 2.20E+10
7 AIG (American International Group) 3.58E+22 3.71E+09
8 MER (Merrill Lynch) 2.81E+22 6.40E+10
9 FNM (Fannie Mae) 2.74E+22 3.80E+10
10 AXP (American Express Company) 2.60E+22 1.79E+10
11 GS (Goldman Sachs Group) 2.41E+22 6.73E+10
12 LEH (Lehman Brothers) 1.80E+22 3.50E+10
Table 13: Pre-Crisis analysis. Top 12 financial institutions ranked according to the index of Systemic
Risk Receiver, the values of market capitalization (MC) in 2008 are also shown in this table.
Rank Ticker Value of SRE Value of MC
1 FNM (Fannie Mae) 2.61E+23 3.80E+10
2 C (Citigroup) 1.29E+23 1.03E+11
3 WB (Wachovia Corp.) 9.68E+22 7.30E+10
4 FRE (Freddie Mac) 8.97E+22 2.20E+10
5 LEH (Lehman Brothers) 5.71E+22 3.50E+10
6 CBG (CBRE Group, Inc.) 3.40E+22 4.04E+09
7 COF (Capital One Financial Corp.) 2.85E+20 1.69E+10
8 MER (Merrill Lynch) 2.32E+22 6.40E+10
9 RF (Regions Financial Corp.) 7.37E+21 1.04E+10
10 CMA (Comerica Inc.) 5.29E+21 4.79E+09
Table 14: Pre-Crisis analysis. Top 10 financial institutions ranked according to the index of Systemic
Risk Emitter, the values of market capitalization (MC) in 2008 are also shown in this table.
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